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Abstract
Medicare Part D’s implementation improved access to and affordability of prescription drugs for
the elderly without prior drug insurance. Effects for specific drugs and drug classes are less well
understood. We assessed Part D’s impact on antipsychotic medication (APM) utilization and out-
of-pocket costs among elderly without prior drug insurance. Retail pharmacy claims from 3
nationwide pharmacy chains were used to analyze two time-series designs: 1) a Policy Model, to
obtain a policymaker’s perspective: what was the overall impact of Part D on APM use and costs
among elderly without drug insurance in 2005 with the opportunity to enroll?, and 2) a Clinical
Model, to obtain a clinician’s perspective: what would happen to elderly without drug insurance in
2005 who did enroll in Part D—would they be able to get APMs? At what cost? Subgroup
analyses among Part D enrollees evaluated potentially different effects for patients who received a
subsidy and patients who used anti-dementia drugs. In the Policy Model, Part D implementation
was associated with a 5% increase in APM use and a 37% reduction in out-of-pocket costs,
suggesting a modest need for APMs among all previously uninsured elderly. Patients who did
enroll in Part D (Clinical Model) had a 97% increase in APM use and a 62% decrease in out-of-
pocket costs, suggesting that patients who needed APMs were able to access them at low cost
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through the Part D program. Part D implementation was associated with increased use and
affordability of APMs for elderly without prior drug insurance.
INTRODUCTION
Medicare Part D’s 2006 implementation is associated with both a 6–19% overall increase in
drug utilization and a 13–18% decrease in out-of-pocket costs.1–6 Changes for specific drugs
are less well understood and vary depending on drugs, disease, and/or the population
studied.7–9 Part D’s impact on the use of and costs for antipsychotic medications (APMs) is
of particular interest to clinicians and policymakers. Legislation required Part D plans to
cover “all or substantially all” APMs because access to a wide number of choices was
considered to be therapeutically important.10 Still, plans were able to apply utilization
management tools such as prior authorization, step therapy, and quantity limits to potentially
restrict use. While the APMs are FDA-approved for the treatment of schizophrenia and
bipolar mania, in the elderly, they are recommended for and most often prescribed “off-
label” to ameliorate the behavioral symptoms of dementia.11 Although concerns persist
about effectiveness and increased risks of adverse events among elderly APM users with
dementia,12–16 APMs may be the best treatment option for some elderly patients. Atypical
APMs, which account for most use among the elderly,17 are quite expensive,18 and so Part
D’s implementation may have removed financial barriers to APM use for patients but
increased financial costs for payers.
In this study, we evaluate the impact of Part D’s 2006 implementation on changes in days’
supply of and out-of-pocket costs for APMs among patients without prior drug insurance
using interrupted time-series designs. Our study takes a multi-faceted approach. In a “Policy
Model,” we examine Part D’s effect on uninsured elderly who had the opportunity to obtain
drug insurance and did or did not enroll in Part D. This model answers the policymaker’s
question—what was Part D’s overall effect on uptake of APMs and out-of-pocket costs
among previously uninsured patients who could now obtain drug insurance?19 Then, in a
“Clinical Model,” we investigate Part D’s impact on the subset of previously uninsured
patients that did enroll in Part D. This model answers the clinician’s questions—if my
patient enrolls in Part D, will he be able to obtain APM medications? At what cost?19
Among enrollees, we also consider whether receiving a subsidy to help defray drug costs
affects utilization. Our study provides evidence regarding Part D’s impact on APM
utilization and costs in a previously uninsured elderly population and discusses Part D’s
policy-related and clinical implications.
METHODS
Study population
The primary population of interest was elderly patients age 65+ with no drug insurance in
2005. Because patients without drug insurance cannot be identified via insurance claims, we
used prescription transaction records from three nationwide retail pharmacy chains. Each
individual and his corresponding prescriptions could be identified within a given pharmacy
chain, but we could not link patient data across pharmacy chains. Therefore, because data
would be lost if patients filled prescriptions at an out-of-chain pharmacy, we established a
closed cohort of patients who filled ≥1 prescription in 2005 and ≥1 in the last six months of
2006 within a given pharmacy chain, although among older adults, pharmacy loyalty is
known to be high.20 This approach allows us to study a population of uninsured elderly who
filled multiple prescriptions at one pharmacy over time—those who had demonstrated need
for medications and might most benefit from Part D’s implementation. From this population,
Polinski et al. Page 2













we selected only those patients who filled ≥1 prescription for an APM during the study
period, January 1, 2005–December 31, 2006.
Because detailed drug insurance plan (third party payment) information was not available,
we applied a previously tested algorithm21 that considers drug costs, out-of-pocket costs,
and Part D’s benefit structure to empirically assign patients’ drug insurance status. Drug
costs were calculated as 80% of the average wholesale price (AWP) for each National Drug
Code, as recommended by the Department of Health and Human Services.22 Patients were
considered uninsured in 2005 if the co-payment amount for ≥80% of their prescriptions was
≥60% of the AWP for all prescriptions costing ≥$20. Patients were considered Part D
insured in 2006 if, between January 1, 2006 and the date when the cumulative price of the
patient’s prescriptions reached $2,000, the out-of-pocket payment for ≥80% of their
prescriptions was <50% of the AWP for all prescriptions costing ≥$20 or if 80% of their
out-of-pocket payments were flat amounts, e.g. $10.00. Prescriptions with costs <$20 were
not considered in the algorithm because the copayments for such drugs were more likely to
exceed 60% of the AWP, artificially making patients appear uninsured. Patients remained
without drug insurance in 2006 if they did not meet the Part D insured in 2006 definition.
This algorithm was designed to have high specificity at the cost of lower sensitivity in order
to ensure that patients who were classified as having no drug insurance truly did not have
coverage.21 Sensitivity analyses that used more and less stringent criteria to identify
uninsured patients had little influence on the number of patients identified.21, 23
Patients who enroll in Part D are potentially eligible to receive a low income subsidy (LIS)
based on their income and assets. Therefore, among Part D enrollees, it was of interest to
determine whether receiving a subsidy affected APM utilization. We identified full subsidy
patients based on Medicare regulations that limited these patients’ out-of-pocket payments
to ≤$3 for a generic and ≤$5 for a branded drug during 2006. In contrast, patients who
qualify for a partial subsidy paid ≤15% co-insurance for each prescription fill; however, Part
D plans could and did vary their co-insurance and co-payment requirements, so patients
receiving a partial subsidy might pay the same amount as a patient who did not receive a
subsidy. Without plan-specific data, nor information on patients’ income or assets, we could
not accurately identify patients who received a partial subsidy. Therefore, patients who
received a partial subsidy or no subsidy were grouped together. The study was approved by
the Brigham and Women’s Hospital Institutional Review Board.
Study design
The study considered two individual data-level time-series designs. The “Policy Model”
examined all patients with no drug insurance in 2005 who had the opportunity to enroll in
Part D, thus investigating Part D’s impact among all patients potentially affected by the
policy and producing a “net impact” of the policy. January 1, 2006, the date of Medicare
Part D implementation, was the exposure. The exposure was well-defined and affected all
patients at the same time. Two segments defined the time series: a 12-month baseline period
(January–December 2005) and a 12-month post-Part D period (January–December 2006). In
the Policy Model, Part D’s impact was evaluated by comparing the actual experience of
patients who did or did not enroll in Part D versus the (hypothetical and counterfactual)
experience of the same group of patients if Part D had not been introduced. The
counterfactual experience was predicted by extrapolating patients’ pre-Part D experience to
the post-Part D period. Therefore, the counterfactual experience included patients who
would have changed their behavior regardless of whether Part D was implemented or not.
The inclusion of these patients is important when, for example, a policymaker wants to
consider the total costs attributable to a new program among both patients who enroll in the
new program and patients who avoid it.19
Polinski et al. Page 3













Our second design, the “Clinical Model” examines only those patients who had no drug
insurance in 2005 and did enroll in Part D in 2006. The Clinical Model differs from the
Policy Model in that it measures Part D’s impact among Part D “compliers” (those who did
enroll in Part D) and compares their experience to the extrapolated, counterfactual
experience of the same group of patients had they not enrolled in Part D.19 The Clinical
Model answers the questions “If my uninsured patient enrolls in Part D, will he be able to
obtain APMs? At what cost?” In the Clinical Model, patients’ covariates might affect when
and whether a patient enrolled in Part D. Therefore, all patients were aligned at their
respective enrollment date, the date of the first of two consecutive prescriptions in 2006 at
which the patient was insured under Part D. We The Part D enrollment date, the exposure,
was set as time zero. Two segments defined the time series: Twelve 30-day periods before
the enrollment date and up to twelve 30-day periods afterwards. In a Clinical Model sub-
analysis, we compared APM utilization among those who received a full subsidy versus
those who received either a partial subsidy or no subsidy at all. Because Medicare legislation
already dictated that full subsidy beneficiaries would pay <$3 for a generic and <$5 for a
branded drug, and because of our inability to separate partial and no subsidy beneficiaries,
we did not conduct a subgroup analysis for changes in APM costs. A second sub-analysis in
the Clinical Model examined potential differences in APM utilization between patients who
received an antidementia drug during 2005–2006 and patients who did not. These patients
might be more likely to be taking APMs to treat symptoms of dementia as compared to
patients who had no anti-dementia drug fills.
Model designs and comparisons
For both time-series designs, the basic analytic model included initial intercept and slope
terms (describing the baseline outcome level (intercept) and the months since baseline
(month)), a term to indicate whether Part D had been implemented (policy, Policy Model) or
whether a person had enrolled in Part D (enroll, Clinical Model), and a second slope term
that described months since Part D implementation (policy_month, Policy Model) or months
since enrollment in Part D (enroll_month, Clinical Model). For both scenarios, we lagged
the time effect by one month to allow for changes to be reflected in prescription fills. More
complex models (e.g., including interaction terms, more segments) might be constructed, but
for this comparison, we restricted the analysis to a basic and predefined model. The
subgroup models for subsidy status and users of anti-dementia drugs included additional
terms to account for the two groups being compared (Appendix).
Basic Policy Model: Outcome = β0 + β1 month + β2 policy + β3 policy _month
Basic Clinical Model: Outcome = β0 + β1 month + β2 endoll + β3 enroll _month
Study outcomes
Total days’ supply of APMs per month was calculated for each model. For a given patient in
a given month, we summed the days’ supply for all APM prescriptions filled in that month
and report the standardized days’ supply per 1,000 patients. The second outcome was the
total out-of-pocket costs for APMs per 30 days’ supply, calculated for each month. For a
given patient in a given month, we summed the out-of-pocket costs for that month, divided
these by the APM days’ supply for that month, and multiplied the result by 30 days.
Patient covariates
We assessed baseline age, sex, geographic region of residence, and two measures of disease
burden, the number of unique medications used24 and the Chronic Disease Score,25 using
dispensing data. Using patients’ zip code, we obtained population density and median
household income data from the Census.26
Polinski et al. Page 4














We assessed baseline characteristics for patients in the Policy Model and patients in the
Clinical Model. To assess Part D’s impact on the days’ supply of and out-of-pocket costs for
APMs, our regression models relied on the Central Limit Theorem to model normally
distributed outcomes with an identity link. Based on past experience,23 we used a first-order
autoregressive covariance structure27 to account for the dependence between data points.
Models were tested with and without the inclusion of the time-varying covariates, number of
unique medications and Chronic Disease Score, as described above. In sensitivity analyses,
we considered alternative distributional assumptions for the outcomes (negative binomial,
Poisson, Gamma) as well as alternative covariance structures as suggested by others.27–29
RESULTS
Of 1.5 million pharmacy patrons age 65+, 114,766 (8%) had no drug insurance from any
source during 2005 and were identified as continuous users of one pharmacy chain. Of
these, 1,957 (2%) patients filled ≥1 prescription for an APM during 2005 or 2006 and were
included in our primary study cohort for the Policy Model analyses (Table 1). Over half
(N=1,073) of the primary study cohort with no drug insurance in 2005 did enroll in Part D in
2006; only these patients were included in the Clinical Model analyses. The majority of
patients in both the Policy and Clinical Model cohorts were female, with a mean age of 80±8
years. Patients in the Clinical Model cohort were slightly less healthy: 43% had a Chronic
Disease Score of 4 or greater, compared to 40% of patients in the Policy Model cohort. Of
those who enrolled in Part D, only 64 (6%) received a Part D full subsidy (data not shown).
Thirty-six percent (382) of Part D enrollees had ≥1 prescription for an anti-dementia drug in
2005–2006.
Under the Policy Model, Part D implementation was associated with an overall 5% increase
in days’ supply over the 12 months of 2006 (Figure 1a). In January 2005, the baseline days’
supply (per 1,000 patients) was 8,941 (95% CI, 8,312–9,570) (Table 2, Policy Model
results). Every month, the days’ supply was increasing by 159 (95% CI, 90–227) the slope.
Part D implementation in January 2006 was associated with an immediate, non-significant
level decrease of -223 (95% CI, -824 – 377) days’ supply, and for every month thereafter, an
additional increase of 151 (95% CI, 49 – 254) days’ supply was observed, a slope change.
Figure 1b displays the Clinical Model results for the days’ supply outcome. Among those
who did enroll in Part D, Part D implementation was associated with an immediate level
increase of 8,007 (95% CI, 7,078–8937) days’ supply (per 1,000 patients), followed by a
decrease of 227 (95% CI, -381 - -73) days’ supply in each month after Part D
implementation, a slope change (Table 2, Clinical Model results). This decrease may reflect
the high rates of discontinuation of these drugs shown in other studies.30 Alternatively,
because our data source had no information on vital status or enrollment, some patients may
have died or changed pharmacies after meeting the cohort eligibility criterion of filling at
least one prescription during the last 6 months of 2006. Finally, because we aligned patients
at their Part D enrollment date in the Clinical Model, there were fewer patients who had 12
months of post-Part D experience. Although we standardized our utilization estimates to
account for the number of patients contributing data, it may be that patients who enrolled in
Part D earlier were less likely to fill APM prescriptions than those who enrolled later in the
year. Even with this decline, Part D was associated with a 97% increase in APM use during
2006 among those who did enroll in the program.
In the subgroup analysis comparing Part D’s impact on APM use among those who received
a Part D full subsidy versus those that received a partial or no subsidy, there was no
significant difference in APM use between the 2 groups in 2005. At Part D implementation,
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APM utilization increased immediately for both groups, and each patient who received a full
subsidy used an additional 4 days supply (95% CI, 0.5 – 8), a level change, per month as
compared to all other patients. There was no significant difference between the two groups
in APM use in each month after Part D implementation (data not shown). There were no
significant differences in APM utilization between anti-dementia drug users and non-users
before or after Part D implementation (data not shown).
During the 12 months of 2006, out-of-pocket costs decreased 37% among those who had an
opportunity to enroll in Part D as described in the Policy Model (Figure 2b). Specifically,
Part D implementation was associated with an immediate level decrease of $31 (95% CI, (-
$36 - -$25) in out-of-pocket costs per 30 days’ supply, and for every month after
implementation, out-of-pocket costs decreased an additional $2 (95% CI, -$3 - -$1) per 30
days’ supply (Table 2, Policy Model results).
Among those patients who did enroll in Part D, the Clinical Model, total out-of-pocket costs
decreased 62% in 2006 (Figure 2b). Enrollment in Part D was associated with an immediate
$86 (95% CI, (-$96 - -$76)) decrease in out-of-pocket costs per 30 days’ supply and a $4
(95% CI, $3 - $5) increase in out-of-pocket costs per 30 days’ supply in each month
thereafter (Table 2, Clinical Model results). Sensitivity analyses using alternate
distributional assumptions and covariance structures for both the days’ supply and out-of-
pocket cost outcomes produced similar results (data not shown).
DISCUSSION
The 5% increase in use of APMs and 37% decrease in out-of-pocket costs per 30 days’
supply observed in 2006 among all patients suggest that Part D was successful in improving
access to and the affordability of APMs for elderly patients without previous drug insurance.
From the policymaker’s perspective (the Policy Model), this increase indicates that there
was a modest unmet need for APMs among this vulnerable, previously uninsured elderly
population. From the clinician’s perspective (the Clinical Model), the results are also
reassuring. Previously uninsured, vulnerable elderly who did enroll in Part D saw a dramatic
62% decrease in their out-of-pocket costs per 30 days’ supply and a correspondingly
dramatic 97% increase in their APM utilization during 2006. In the subgroup analysis, full
subsidy patients who saw their costs reduced more than those of other patients used only
slightly more days supply of APMs. However, these results are preliminary as there were
few full subsidy patients and partial subsidy patients could not be distinguished from those
who received a full subsidy.
Early studies of Part D’s impact on medication use overall produced strikingly similar
estimates of its effect. For example, two studies using prescription claims from a large
pharmacy chain found 5–13% absolute increases in days of therapy and 13–19% decreases
in out-of-pocket costs.4, 5 A third study that used claims from a prescription transaction
manager found that compared with a cohort of patients aged 58–64, patients 65+
experienced an 8.1% days supply increase and a 17.2% decrease in out-of-pocket costs from
2005–2006.3 Studies of specific medication classes have found similar changes in drug
utilization following Part D implementation, but the magnitude of these changes varies by
drug class. For example, a study in a single Medicare Advantage plan found 44% increases
from 2005 to 2006 in the number of monthly prescriptions for both lipid-lowering
medications and for oral anti-diabetic drugs among patients without prior drug coverage
who newly enrolled in Part D.31 In a study using retail pharmacy claims from the same three
pharmacy chains as our study, Schneeweiss et al. found an increase in defined daily dose of
statins (22%), clopidogrel (11%) and proton pump inhibitors (37%) in 2006 among
previously uninsured elderly who had the opportunity to enroll in Part D.23 Our smaller 5%
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increase in APM use in the Policy Model may reflect the unmet need for APMs among the
uninsured population versus the unmet need for statins or oral anti-diabetic drugs,
medications that are indicated for use by many more patients. Finally, Chen et al. observed a
7% increase in antidepressant and an 18% increase in antipsychotic prescriptions in 2006 as
compared to 2005 among community-dwelling seniors who patronized a large pharmacy
chain.32 The 18% increase in APMs is three times that of the increase we found in our
comparable Policy Model population. However, Chen et al.’s results are difficult to interpret
because their population included patients both with and without drug insurance in 2005 and
because their utilization measure did not adjust for changes in study sample size from 2005
to 2006.
The reductions in out-of-pocket costs per 30 days’ supply that we found in the Policy Model
population (37%) and the Clinical Model populations (62%) are similar to those observed in
other studies of those with no drug insurance prior to Part D implementation. Schneeweiss et
al. noted out-of-pocket cost decreases of 52% for statins, 58% for clopidogrel, and 56% for
proton pump inhibitors during 2006 in a population similar to our Policy Model
population.23 Across all medications classes, Zhang et al. observed a 45% reduction in the
proportion of drug costs that were paid out-of-pocket in 2006 as compared to 2005 in a
group with no prior drug coverage who newly enrolled in Part D.33
The differences between our Policy Model and Clinical Model results reflect the self-
selection of patients into the Part D program. In contrast to the Policy Model results, which
combine the experiences of patients who both did and did not enroll, the Clinical Model
results describes only the population that did enroll in Part D. Clinical Model patients likely
believed that by enrolling in Part D, they would gain improved access to and reduce out-of-
pocket spending for their prescription drugs. These patients were also sicker and used more
medications in 2005 than did the larger population examined by the Policy Model. Because
the Clinical Model reflects the experience of those who “complied” with the policy and
enrolled, it is not surprising that the magnitude of changes in APM utilization and out-of-
pocket costs are much stronger than those for the Policy Model population. Still, both
models are of use. For policymakers who want to determine the real-world costs and
utilization implications of offering improved insurance coverage, the Policy Model offers
this perspective. For clinicians and others who wish to see if their patients who needed
APMs were able to access them after Part D enrollment, the Clinical Model offers that
perspective.
Retail pharmacy data offer a prime opportunity to study the drug utilization patterns of
previously uninsured patients who, by definition, do not have insurance claims prior to
obtaining drug insurance. However, there are limitations to using these data. Firstly, one
cannot capture prescription fills that take place outside a given retail pharmacy chain. In
order to mitigate against the possibility of outside pharmacy use, we required multiple fills
in a single pharmacy chain during both the baseline year, 2005 and the study year, 2006.
Further, while among all U.S. residents of any age, 80% use a single pharmacy in a given
year,34 pharmacy loyalty among those aged 65+ is known to be much higher. In a study of
low-income elderly, patients filled 96% of prescriptions at a single pharmacy location during
the course of a year and 97% within a single pharmacy chain.20 Therefore, our requirement
of consistent pharmacy use coupled with data on pharmacy loyalty among the elderly offer
reassurance that most prescriptions are recorded. On the other hand, our results may only be
generalizable to those elderly that tend to patronize a particular pharmacy or pharmacy
chain. If prescriptions for APMs were filled outside of the pharmacy chains we studied, then
our results would represent a conservative estimate of use in this population. Researchers
using retail pharmacy data must also be mindful of potentially unrecorded prescription fills
that take place under a retailer’s $4 generic program. These programs are of limited concern
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in our study, however, as our study period is 2005–2006. The first $4 generic program did
not begin until September 200635 and the retail pharmacies we studied did not begin their
programs until some months later. Further, the majority of new APM use is among the
atypical medications,17 none of which are available generically, making the most-used
APMs ineligible for inclusion in these programs. Uninsured elderly who did not fill any
prescriptions would not appear in retail pharmacy claims and are a population best studied
through the use of survey methods. However, Part D’s implementation would offer these
patients the same opportunity for improved access to medications and reduced costs as those
elderly who we did study.
Another limitation of retail pharmacy claims is that they do not provide information as to
whether increased APM use had a beneficial impact on the health of the previously
uninsured elderly, nor do they indicate the underlying reason for the APM prescriptions.
Because the prevalence of elderly patients with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia is small
(~1.9%),36, 37 fulfilling the unmet need for APMs among these patients would not explain a
5% increase in APMs days’ supply among the population who had the opportunity to enroll
in Part D, nor the 97% increase in APMs days’ supply among the population that did enroll.
In fact, many APM prescriptions may have been filled for other indications such as treating
the behavioral symptoms of dementia. Of our Part D enrollees, 36% filled a prescription for
an anti-dementia drug during 2005–2006, suggesting that a sizeable portion of APM use was
to treat dementia symptoms. Elderly patients with dementia who use APMs have 1.6–2.0
times the risk of adverse events and death as compared to non-users.13–16 In practical terms,
this means that for every 664 elderly patients with dementia taking APMs, one will
experience an adverse event.15 Therefore, while Part D reduced out-of-pocket burden and
enhanced patients’ ability to fill their prescriptions, in the case of the APMs, it may have had
the unintentional consequence of causing harm. Clinicians, patients’ families and even
patients themselves may argue that when the benefits that APMs provide to some elderly
patients are weighed against the risks of harm, improved access under Part D is a positive
outcome overall. On the other hand, policymakers might contend that increased risks and
harms, regardless of any potential benefit, should not be funded with taxpayer monies.
As the provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 201038 are
implemented and health reform occupies center stage, policymakers, researchers, and
clinicians will grapple with how to best evaluate the population-level effects of these health
policy changes and their specific impact on mental health care and APM use. Our results
regarding Part D’s impact on APM utilization and costs in a population with no previous
drug insurance can be used as a baseline to assess the impact of health care expansion for
uninsured Americans and to evaluate changes in insurance coverage for others. These future
evaluations will be crucial to ensuring the judicious use of our limited health care resources.
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a. Part D's impact on APM use among all uninsured patients who did or did not enroll in
Part D in 2006 (Policy Model)
b: Part D's impact on APM use among only those patients who enrolled in Part D in 2006
(Clinical Model)
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a. Part D's impact on out-of-pocket costs among all uninsured patients who did or did not
enroll in Part D in 2006 (Policy Model)
b. Part D's impact on APM use among only those patients who enrolled in Part D in 2006
(Clinical Model)
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Table 1
Baseline characteristics of patients with no drug insurance in 2005
All patients with the
opportunity to enroll
in Medicare Part D
(The Policy Model)
Patients who enrolled
in Medicare Part D
(The Clinical Model)
N (%) or mean ± SD
N 1957 (100.0) 1073 (54.8)
Age, in years as of January 1, 2006 80.2 ± 7.6 79.5 ± 7.6
 65 – 74 503 (25.7) 309 (28.8)
 75 – 84 865 (44.2) 474 (44.2)
 85+ 589 (30.1) 290 (27.0)
Female gender 1354 (69.2) 730 (68.0)
Region of residence
 Midwest 469 (24.0) 260 (24.2)
 Northeast 40 (2.0) 22 (2.1)
 South 727 (37.2) 426 (39.7)
 West 721 (36.8) 365 (34.0)
Population density (persons/square mile) 1750.9 ± 2328.2 1615.2 ± 2168.1
 <500 821 (42.0) 481 (44.8)
 500 – 999.99 213 (10.9) 111 (10.3)
 1,000 – 1,499.99 152 (7.8) 88 (8.2)
 1,500+ 738 (37.7) 373 (34.8)
Median income 47568.6 ± 19199.8 46390.3 ± 18268.5
 <$20,000 28 (1.4) 18 (1.7)
 $20,000 – $39,999 759 (38.8) 434 (40.5)
 $40,000 – $59,999 740 (37.8) 404 (37.7)
 > $60,000 397 (20.3) 197 (18.4)
Number of unique medications, July – December 2005 10.0 ± 5.9 10.5 ± 5.6
 5 or less 440 (22.5) 195 (18.2)
 6 – 9 medications 627 (32.0) 341 (31.8)
 10 – 14 medications 518 (26.5) 323 (30.1)
 15+ medications 372 (19.0) 214 (19.9)
Chronic Disease Score, July – December 2005 3.3 ± 2.9 3.4 ± 2.9
 0 432 (22.1) 210 (19.6)
 1 – 3 736 (37.6) 406 (37.8)
 4+ 789 (40.3) 457 (42.6)
*
Population density and median income were missing for 33 (1.7%) of all patients and 20 (1.9%) of patients who enrolled in Part D
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Table 2
Part D’s impact on APM use and costs among all uninsured patients (Policy Model) and among only those
patients who enrolled in Part D (Clinical Model)
All uninsured patients
(Policy Model)








( in US $)
















(Slope change per month)
159





Effect of Part D implementation









Time trend after Part D
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